Since the implementation of the Bidding Law, relevant laws and regulations have been promulgated continuously, and the efforts to standardize the project bidding market have been increasing. However, discordant notes such as false bidding, collusive bidding and bid rigging frequently appear, and many people are convicted of collusive bidding every year. For example, in the largest municipal engineering bidding case involving nearly 300 million yuan, all the people involved were sentenced to punishment by Wenzhou court for colluding in bidding and fined 50,000 yuan to 800,000 yuan. I'm afraid these phenomena can't be summarized by the phrase "weak legal consciousness", but should be considered from the system.
First, appropriately expand the scope of bidding.
Theoretically, public bidding can achieve fair competition and eliminate corruption to a certain extent, but its efficiency is questionable. Looking at the international market, in the past decade, the annual turnover of 225 major international contracting companies accounted for about 40% of the total global contracts, and 90% of their contracts were obtained through negotiation. The Standing Committee of Contract Conditions of the British Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) believes that international competitive bidding wastes time and money and is inefficient, which leads many contractors to waste money and manpower. In contrast, selective bidding, that is, international limited bidding, can produce the highest and all aspects of economic benefits. Therefore, the main bidding method implemented in the Commonwealth region is international limited bidding.
China's national conditions have their own characteristics. In order to ensure fairness, put an end to corruption and force bidding, it is necessary not to conduct substantive negotiations, but the efficiency of bidding should also be considered, otherwise it will not be fair. Appropriately expanding the scope of bidding is a feasible way. The Measures for Tendering and Bidding of Construction Projects stipulates that if the cost of public bidding is not worthy of public bidding compared with the value of the project, the invitation bidding method can be adopted, which has made a good start in giving consideration to efficiency. However, there are many influencing factors to judge whether the value of a project is worthy of public bidding, and there are different views from different angles.
It is difficult to accurately quantify the quality, schedule and cost of a project with a mathematical model. Saving cost under reasonable quality and schedule constraints is an important reason for owners to choose projects for bidding. Bidding has a cost. When the cost of bidding is greater than the cost that bidding can save, bidding is inefficient. If mandatory bidding is required at this time, false bidding will have internal motivation. At the same time, many projects have to catch up with some opportunities, such as market opportunities and policy opportunities. And it is often difficult to meet such an opportunity in the long process of examination and approval and bidding. There are some complicated relationships between some employers and specific contractors, which may not necessarily have a negative impact on the project. At this time, compulsory public bidding will inevitably produce resistance in the hearts of employers, which is not difficult to understand, obvious and implicit.
The Standard Provisions on the Bidding Scope and Scale of Engineering Construction Projects stipulates that the engineering construction projects with the estimated price of a single construction contract of more than 2 million yuan belong to the compulsory bidding scope. In local laws and regulations, this provision tends to be strictly enforced. In order to reflect fairness, public bidding is often adopted in various places. The technical content of projects with more than 2 million yuan is usually not high, the number of potential bidders is large, and the social cost of bidding is high. It is difficult to screen bidders only through qualification examination, and it is difficult to avoid suspected discrimination. Therefore, it is not surprising that there are a large number of illegal acts such as bidding, selling bids and enclosing bids that can effectively reduce the bidding cost.
The inefficiency of public bidding is an important reason for the existence of a large number of the above-mentioned illegal acts. Local administrative departments should refine the management of bidding methods, appropriately expand the scope of invited bidding, and improve the efficiency of bidding. At the same time, it is necessary to introduce and improve the corresponding institutional measures, such as the contractor's credit rating, guarantee, bidding threshold fees, etc.
Second, broaden the channels for bidders to obtain information.
Article 22 of the Law on Tendering and Bidding stipulates that "the tenderee shall not disclose to others the names and quantities of potential bidders who have obtained the tender documents ...", and the bidders cannot know who the potential opponents are from normal channels, so everyone has to rush headlong into it. There are dozens of bidders in a project, so the social cost of bidding can be imagined, and these costs will inevitably be passed on to the project cost, so the efficiency of bidding can not be high. At the same time, the "Bidding Law" allows the organization of on-site reconnaissance, and it is difficult to ensure that bidders do not know each other from the system, but just do not want bidders to know each other from normal channels (bidders), artificially increasing the bidding cost. Moreover, knowing each other does not necessarily lead to collusive bidding. I hope that not knowing each other has not actually eliminated or reduced the occurrence of collusive bidding.
Many foreign-related projects in the Commonwealth region (including countries that were formerly British colonies) usually inform bidders of the number of contractors who sent the documents when issuing bidding documents, so as to have a good idea and avoid blind bidding. This system design can alleviate the situation of too many bidders in the bidding process to a certain extent and improve the bidding efficiency, which is worth learning.
Third, let the bid evaluation experts fully understand the bidding documents.
Tendering documents tend to be thicker and thicker. In the case of "more than enough", there are many bidders, the bid evaluation time is usually short, and useful information or key information is submerged in the ocean of information. It is difficult for bid evaluation experts to fully understand the bidding documents, and they can only extract limited information that they think is key according to their personal judgment. Bidding documents may become part of the contract, which is very difficult to compress. In practice, it is unlikely to extend the bid evaluation time. If bid evaluation experts want to fully understand the bidding documents, they must improve the efficiency of information transmission. If the bidder can be required to provide the abstract of the tender documents or directly provide the audio-visual materials specified by the bidder in the tender documents, the length of the abstract or audio-visual materials can be appropriately limited, and the bidder shall be responsible for its authenticity and consistency with the tender documents, and the clearing personnel shall be responsible for inspection. This treatment not only takes care of fairness, but also greatly improves the efficiency of bid evaluation.
Fourth, it is not appropriate to completely deny lottery tickets.
Due to the imperfect market development and the corresponding system, it is difficult to implement the lowest bid winning method or similar bid evaluation method in practice. At present, most of the bid evaluation methods adopt comprehensive evaluation method, and often the bid is won by a few points. A fraction or even a fraction of the gap can not prove the essential difference between bidders before, let alone the difference of project construction results. This method of calibration with small differences seems fair, but it leaves a lot of room for manual intervention. Faced with this result, it is really hard for others to accuse the grading of unfairness, and the administrative department is helpless. This situation is fatal to bidders and even the whole bidding environment.
It seems absurd to draw lots for calibration, but it is reasonable and feasible under certain conditions. For example, it is reasonable for bidders with comprehensive scores within a certain range to participate in the lottery: (1) will not adversely affect the construction results. The Bidding Law gives the tenderee the right to choose the winning bidder freely from the winning candidates. It can be seen that even if the project construction result is not ideal, it is not caused by drawing lots for calibration. (2) Reduce human interference. It is difficult to blame the rationality of the score if the score gap is small, but it is easy to see the irrationality of the score if the score gap is large. It is impossible for the bid evaluation committee to let people "complete the task" with a score difference of several tenths. Finally, it is difficult to decide by drawing lots, which objectively ensures the fairness of the winning results.
At present, under the condition of "surplus", excessive competition is inevitable, and the design of bid evaluation system must be practical. This method is reasonable as long as it does not have a negative impact on the final project results. In the Gulf War, poker wanted order brought a very serious political problem into the game. Isn't that ridiculous? But it is very practical. The same is true for drawing lots for calibration, and this seemingly absurd method cannot be completely denied. Under certain conditions, government investment projects can adopt this lottery calibration method, which can limit human interference and effectively reduce the "corruption index".
Five, the design of bidding system and method should pay attention to the system.
Any management control is to achieve certain goals. The purpose of Bidding Law is "to standardize the bid-winning activities, protect the national interests, social interests and the legitimate rights and interests of the parties involved in bidding activities, improve economic benefits and ensure the quality of the project", and the design of bidding system and method must revolve around this goal. Whether the system and method are reasonable depends on whether the final result of the project is satisfactory, and the core of satisfaction is to improve economic benefits and ensure the quality of the project. Bidding is only a link in project management. The evaluation of bidding system and method should not be limited to the bidding link, but should form feedback based on the results of project construction, and adjust the system and method through feedback. For example, the investigation of bid evaluation experts should be linked to the final construction results. If the final construction result of a bid evaluation expert is not satisfactory, then the bid evaluation method of this bid evaluation expert is very doubtful, and it is even necessary to consider whether to leave the expert in the expert database. At present, the system, methods and research are often limited to the bidding link itself, and "winning the bid at a low price and settling the account at a high price" has become the knowledge in the industry. This system design does not pay attention to systematic reflection to a certain extent.
This kind of system management is very difficult, especially for the regulatory authorities. Some measures should be taken to highlight the key points of supervision. For example, after the bid-winning notice is issued, bidders are required to make comments on this tender, and the statistical results of opinions are reported to the regulatory authorities, and the statistical results should be publicized. Whether the legitimate rights and interests of the parties are protected or not, only the parties have the most say. If the dissatisfaction rate of the parties is high, the bidding supervision department should focus on monitoring and handling, or jointly supervise and hand over the construction process of key projects to other departments, and change passive supervision into active supervision without waiting for complaints.
System management also puts forward high requirements for the organizational design of the supervision department. The organizational structure of the supervision department should not only face the superior, but also meet the requirements of centralized management, and should be conducive to horizontal communication between departments. As mentioned above, if the tender management department finds that the satisfaction of a tender is abnormal, although there is doubt, but there is not enough evidence to deal with it, it should be handed over to relevant departments (such as cost and quality supervision departments) for key tracking, and the latter will feed back the tracking results to the tender management department in time. To realize system management, the chief executive should first become an organic system, not a collection of departments.
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