Conditions: If the scheme cannot be approved by more than half of the participants, it will be implemented. The distribution order is a > b > C.
If you are one of them, how should you propose?
At first, everyone thought that C would win by doing nothing, but instead, A won the most gold coins. (Of course, in the end, Ji's argument is that if the force value is stronger, all strategies are floating clouds. )
Sort out the train of thought from the beginning:
Suppose: A is allocated according to the maximization of C's interests: A 0, B 0, C 100. C will still veto a's proposal. Because after A and B are executed, they will avoid revenge.
The principle is:
1. If C wants to get the most money, it only needs to veto the distribution of A and B. ..
2. Party B knows that if the scheme allocated by Party A is rejected, then in the subsequent two-person game, if the scheme can not be more than half, it will be implemented. So B should support all the decisions made by A. ..
3.A knows that B will definitely support his decision, so A will maximize its own interests.
The answer given in the play is that scheme A can be 99 1, 0.
The specific game reasoning process can be seen in pirate games.
This model is actually a reasoning model in economics. Suppose everyone is an economic man (thinking rationally). In fact, in most cases, people are influenced by emotions. Classic: I don't want you or money, but it's very important to me without you.
Some time ago, when measuring the effectiveness of an organization, one of the indicators was to record the number of tasks handled by a single person in that month. Judging from the first reaction, everyone thinks there is no problem.
Next, at the beginning, the number is calculated according to the creation time of the task. When the data is displayed, most people think that this task was created a long time ago, but it took me a lot of time to complete this month, so it must be counted according to the completion time.
The combination of logic and emotion is so interesting.