Problem description:
Title:
Five pirates took 100 priceless jewels, exactly the same. So now it's time to divide the dirty (pirates don't divide them according to our usual method, and everyone wants the most), so someone put forward a method and everyone agreed. This method is: draw lots to arrange five pirates as 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, starting with the pirate 1, let him come up with a distribution plan and decide how much each person will get, and then if more than 50% (including 50%) of the pirates agree, he will follow his distribution plan, but if this standard is not met,
Conditions:
1. Every pirate just wants to get the maximum benefit.
All pirates have the same intelligence. If a pirate can think of something, so can other pirates.
Please answer:
Which pirate do you think can gain the most from not being thrown into the sea? What is the reason? Distribution plan?
Analysis:
If you throw 1, 2, 3 into the sea, there will be 4 or 5 pirates left.
You have to take it all on the 4 th, because he agreed when voting, and it is already 50%.
No.5 will definitely not give No.4 a chance to share, so he will agree that No.3 should not take it all.
Plan.
As a result, No.3 was not pushed into the sea. He chose to give No.5 1 gem and give himself 99 gem, but No.5 must agree, otherwise he will get nothing, and No.4 will get nothing.
Moreover, No.4 had predicted that if No.3 scored, he would not get a piece of the action, so he would agree to the plan that No.2 shared with himself.
In order not to go to sea, No.2 only shared with No.4. As a result, No.2 had 99 and No.4 had 1. No.4 can only accept this condition, so that the passing rate will reach 50%, otherwise he won't get any points on No.3.
No.3 and No.5 got nothing.
Of course, No.3 and No.5 can't tolerate No.2, so the distribution plan of 1 will be passed as long as there are them. So 1 didn't go to sea, so he would give 1 to No.3 and No.5 gems.
Finally, the pirates hesitated again and again. Agreement on 1, No.3 and No.5: 1 takes 98, and No.3 and No.5 take 1 respectively.