2. First, 1 put forward the distribution plan, and then five people voted. When and only when more than half of the people agree, they will be distributed according to his proposal, otherwise they will be thrown into the sea to feed sharks.
3. If not. 1 dead, the distribution plan will be put forward on the 2 nd, and then four people will vote. If and only if more than half of the people agree, they will be distributed according to his proposal, otherwise they will be thrown into the sea to feed sharks.
4. By analogy
Conditions: Every pirate is a very smart person who can rationally judge gains and losses and make choices.
Question: What distribution scheme did the first pirate propose to maximize his income?
The standard answer for pirates to divide gems
Answer 97: 0: 1: 0: 2
The reason is simple:
Push back:
Pirate No.5 knows very well that he won't wait until No.5 to get the 100 gem himself, because he knows that Pirate No.4 is not an idiot.
If we wait until the 4th, 4th and 5th, there will be only two people left. In order to save his life, No.4 will give all the 100 gems to No.5, so the distribution result of No.4 is 0: 100 (but No.4 still has the risk of losing his life).
If we wait until the 3 rd, there are still three people left. 3 rd, 4 th, 5 th and 3 rd give a gem to 4 th to win support. If you don't agree on the 4th, you may lose your life in the next round, or you won't get 1. By contrast, getting a gem is very economical, so he will agree. So not at the fifth meeting. So the distribution result of number 3 is 99: 1: 0.
If we wait until the 2nd, there will be four people left. No.2, No.3, No.4, No.5 and No.2 will agree, unless 100 is given to No.3, which will cause too much loss, so I would rather not give No.3 any support votes. Here, if you give No.4 two No.4, you will gladly support it, because if No.4 doesn't agree, No.4 can only get 1 and take more/kloc in the next round. In the same way, you can only give No.5 a gem (you can't wait for the next round of No.3 to divide it, and there is no 1), so 1 is enough; So the result of the distribution of the number 2
97:0:2: 1
So now we have to divide the number 1. No.2 will not agree unless it is given to 98, which will also lose too many benefits, so I would rather not give No.2 any support votes. Of course, it is enough to give him 1 on the 3rd, because if the 3rd doesn't agree, the 3rd can only get 1 in the next round, so it is still cost-effective to get more 1. Similarly, in order to get the support of No.4, 1 has to give him three gems (more than the next round 1). Similarly, to get the support of No.5, 1 has to give him two gems (more than the next round of 1 1). Of course, it is impossible to give no.4 and no.5 gems at the same time, which is not cost-effective. As long as one of them is given, you can get a total of ***3 votes. Of course, he will give it on the 5th, because he only needs two gems. So the allocation scheme of number one is 97: 0: 1: 0: 2.
At this time, 1 has the most gems and the least risk.
Pirates 1
Pirate 2
Pirate 3
Pirate 4
Pirate 5
Piracy 1 (PCs) distribution scheme
97 0 1 0 2
The Release Plan of Pirate 2 (PCs)
outcome
97
2
1
Piracy No.3 (PCs) Distribution Plan
outcome
outcome
99
1
Pirate 4 (PCs) distribution plan
outcome
outcome
outcome
100
Pirate 5 (PCs) distribution plan
outcome
outcome
outcome
outcome
100
According to the supplementary explanation of the question:
The title says: if and only if more than half of the people agree, distribute it according to his proposal, or throw it into the sea to feed sharks.
When half the people agree, the meaning of the question exceeds you and you live! But it happened that it didn't exceed, so we had to wait for the shark to arrive.
So in the fourth article, only you agree, as long as the fifth article does not agree, you will only die!