① Suppose 1, 2 and 3 are all dead, leaving only 4 and 5. At this time, no matter how No.4 is divided (even if No.5 is divided into 100), No.5 will die as long as it opposes (because more than half of those in favor must exceed 50%), and No.4' s life cannot be guaranteed, so No.4 can let No.3 die. Everyone agrees on the 4th. ② Assuming that 1 and No.2 are both dead, if No.3 is divided, he will definitely divide himself into 100, and No.4 and No.5 will both have 0, because No.3 will definitely agree and No.4 will definitely agree, so there will be more than 50% of the votes. (3) suppose 1 is dead, and No.2 will be divided. No.2 will definitely not buy it. Both No.4 and No.5 have to agree (assuming No.2 dies, No.4 and No.5 can get either. Now they have been given 1 person and 1 person on the 2nd, so they have to agree. Number 2 will be divided like this: 98,0,65,438+0,65,438+0). ④ Suppose 65438. Because if you give 1 to No.3, No.3 will agree to the division of 1. If No.3 disagrees, No.2 scores. If 1 dies, No.3 gets no points. At this time 1 only needs to buy either No.4 or No.5. If you give this person two, he will definitely agree. So, 1 to do.
A: The first pirate's proposal is: 97,0, 1, 0,2; Or: the distribution scheme of 97,0, 1, 2,0 can maximize its own income.