The reasoning process is as follows: from the back to the front, if all the robbers from/kloc-0 to 3 feed sharks, only No.4 and No.5 are left, and No.5 will definitely vote against it, so that No.4 will feed sharks and keep all the gold coins for himself. Therefore, No.4 can only save his life by supporting No.3. Knowing this, No.3 will put forward the distribution scheme of "100,0,0", and will leave all the gold coins to No.4 and No.5, because he knows that No.4 has got nothing, but he will still vote for it. With his own vote, his scheme will be passed. However, if No.2 infers the plan of No.3, it will put forward the plan of "98,0, 1, 1", that is, give up No.3 and give No.4 and No.5 a gold coin each. Since the plan is more favorable to No.4 and No.5 than No.3, they support him and don't want him to be out and assigned by No.3 ... So No.2 took 98 gold coins. Similarly, the scheme of No.2 will be understood by 1, and a scheme of (97,0, 1, 2,0) or (97,0, 1, 0,2) will be proposed, that is, No.2 will be abandoned and No.3 will be given a gold coin. At the same time, because of/kloc, This is undoubtedly the scheme that 1 can get the greatest benefit! The answer is: 1 robber gave robber No.3 1 gold coin, and gave it to robber No.4 or No.5, and he got 97 pieces himself. The allocation scheme can be written as (97,0, 1, 2,0) or (97,0, 1, 0,2). Senior leaders in enterprises often abandon the second person when they engage in insider control, and get on well with accountants and cashiers, because the little people in the company are easy to be bought off. 1 It seems most likely to feed sharks, but he firmly grasped the first-Mover advantage, which not only eliminated the death threat, but also benefited the most. Isn't this the first-Mover advantage of developed countries in the process of globalization? No.5 looks the safest, has no death threat, and can even take advantage of fishermen, but because it depends on other people's faces, it can only be divided into a small part. However, if the model arbitrarily changes a hypothetical condition, the final result will be different. The real world is far more complicated than the model. First of all, in reality, everyone is definitely not "absolutely rational". Returning to the model of "pirates sharing gold", as long as one of No.3, No.4 and No.5 deviates from the assumption of absolute cleverness, pirates 1 may be thrown into the sea no matter how they share it. So 1 should first consider whether the intelligence and rationality of his pirate brothers are reliable, otherwise it will be the first to suffer. If someone prefers to watch their partner being thrown into the sea to feed sharks. If so, wouldn't 1' s smug scheme be digging its own grave! So there is a saying that "the heart and abdomen are separated". Because information asymmetry, lies and false promises are of great use, conspiracy will grow like weeds and take advantage of it. If No.2 throws smoke bombs at No.3, No.4 and No.5, it claims that it will definitely add another gold coin to any distribution scheme proposed by 1. So, what will be the result? Usually in reality, everyone has their own standards of fairness, so they often whisper, "Who moved my cheese?" It can be expected that once the scheme proposed by 1 doesn't conform to its imagination, someone will make a scene ... When everyone makes a scene, can 1 walk out with 97 gold coins unscathed and calm? Most likely, the pirates will demand that the rules be revised and then redistributed. Think of Hitler's Germany before World War II! And what if you change from a game to a repeated game? For example, let's make it clear that the next time we get 100 gold coins, Pirate II will divide them first ... and Pirate III will separate them ... a bit like the US presidential election, taking turns in power. To put it bluntly, it is actually a democratic form of stolen goods sharing system. The most terrible thing is that the other four people formed a grand alliance against the number 1 and formulated new rules: four people divided the gold coins equally and threw the number 1 into the sea ... This is the revolutionary ideal of Ah Q style: hold high the banner of egalitarianism and throw the rich into the abyss of death ... The system regulates behavior and reason overcomes ignorance! Suppose it becomes 10 person 100 gold coin, and more than 50% of the votes are passed, otherwise he will be thrown into the sea to feed sharks, and so on. 50% is the key to the problem, pirates can vote for themselves. So if there are two people left, no matter what scheme is passed, it is 100, 0. Push up one step, when there are three people, the third from the bottom knows that if there are two people, then it will unite the first person and give him a gold coin "push forward." Now a more fierce pirate P3 has been added. P 1 knows-P3 knows he knows-if P3's scheme is rejected, the game will only be continued by P 1 and P2, and P 1 won't get a gold coin. So P3 knows that as long as P 1 is given a gold coin, P 1 will agree to his plan (of course, if P 1 is not given a gold coin, P 1 will get nothing anyway, and would rather vote P3 to feed the fish). So P3' s best strategy is: P 1 get 1, P2 gets nothing, P3 gets 99. The situation at P4 is similar. He just needs one vote. Giving P2 a gold coin can make him vote for this scheme, because P2 will get nothing in the next P3 scheme. P5 used the same reasoning method, except that he had to convince his two companions, so he gave P 1 and P3, who got nothing in P4 plan, a gold coin and kept 98 for himself. By analogy, the final best scheme of P 10 is: he gets 96 pieces by himself and gives P2, P4, P6 and P8 a gold coin which is nothing in P9 scheme.
result
As a result, the final result of "pirate sharing gold" is that P 1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P 1, 0, 1, 0, respectively. In the "pirate sharing", the key for any distributor to get his plan passed is to consider clearly what the challenger's distribution plan is in advance, so as to get the maximum benefit at the least cost, thus attracting the most dissatisfied people in the challenger's distribution plan. It's really unbelievable. P 10 seems to be the most likely to feed sharks, but he firmly grasped the first-Mover advantage, which not only eliminated the death threat, but also gained the maximum benefit. P 1 seems to be the safest, without death threat, and can even take advantage of fishermen. However, because it depends on other people's faces, it can't even get a small piece of cake, so it can only help.